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The World as Database
In the beginning was the mainframe computer: a large and some-
what ramshackle collection of boxes joined by wires. Then came the
personal computer: a single, small box, which you could fit on your desk.
At about the same time came functionalist conceptions of minds as
“black boxes”. And much fascination with the idea that the mind is a
computer (and even, contrariwise, that the computer is a mind).
Now, however, the box conception of computers and minds is slowly
losing its grip. Computers are connected together in gigantic networks;
they move around; and, through Global Positioning Systems (GPS), they
always know where they are. They are attached to digital video cameras
and to meteorological and chemical and biological and medical and
gamma ray sensors.1 There are cognitive prostheses; wearable comput-
ers; computers you can hold in your hand; computers you can talk
through; computers that can display the seismographic features of the
terrain they are pointed at; computers that can display the vital signs of
a patient you are examining who is a thousand miles away.
The European Media Lab in Heidelberg is testing tourism information
services built into camera-sized computers which are at one and the
same time ever-attentive tour guides, map displays, and cameras. You can
point your computer/camera to the castle on the hill and ask it to read
out the history of the castle; or display a map showing all non-smoking
restaurants within walking distance; or inform you where in the vicinity
of the castle you can buy cornflakes after 10 p.m. Computer/camera/sensor
devices with even more powerful features are transforming the ways wars
are fought and emergencies responded to. They are transforming com-
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puters themselves into entities that are, like human beings and other or-
ganisms, sensitive in different ways to their surroundings.
Knowledge Down a Wire
In the age of computers as boxes there arose the doctrine of method-
ological solipsism – also sometimes called “cognitivism” or “representa-
tionalism” (the differences do not matter here) – a doctrine that is com-
monly associated with the name of Fodor.2 In order to understand a
mind, on this doctrine – that is, in order to establish in scientific fashion
the laws governing mental processes – you need to abstract away from
all relations to any real-world objects toward which these mental pro-
cesses might be directed. One should for methodological purposes as-
sume, in other words, that solipsism is true, that the mind is a window-
less monad. The parallel doctrine as applied to computers runs: com-
puters are purely syntactic devices. Your computer deals, after all, not
with things (castles, cornflakes), but with strings (with 1’s and 0’s); with
what can be transmitted in the form of electrical impulses down a wire
(or nerve). It is lacking all semantics.
Harry M. Collins tells the following story.3 Imagine a 5-stone weak-
ling whose brain has been loaded with all the knowledge of a champion
tennis player. He goes to serve in his first match – Wham! – His arm
falls off. The 5-stone weakling just doesn’t have the bone structure or
muscular development to serve that hard. 
There are, clearly, different types of knowledge/ability/skill, only
some of which are a matter of what can be transferred simply by passing
signals down a wire from one brain (or computer) to another. Some-
times it is the body (the hardware) which knows. Sometimes it is the world
(the environment) which knows. Your GPS device knows its location,
not because of the impulses running through its wiring, and not because
of the state of its hardware – but because it is at any given moment
receiving quite specific signals from satellites and because these signals
contain information to which it is sensitive in virtue of the precise loca-
tion which it occupies in that moment. Human beings are sensitive to
the information contained in other human beings’ faces. Homing pigeons
are sensitive to highly nuanced features of the earth’s magnetic field. Hu-
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man beings who can read are sensitive to the astonishingly variable types
of information contained in printed texts. 
Information in the Light
As Andy Clark argues in his book Being There: Putting Brain, Body and
World Together Again,4 we know more than is contained in the hardware
and software of our minds because we are able to engage in what Clark
calls epistemic action. We manipulate Scrabble tiles in order to be able to
use the re-arranged pieces as a basis for the activation of the brain’s pre-
conscious pattern-recognition abilities. We write one number above an-
other in order to be able to carry out complex calculations using pen
on paper by allowing our hands to perform manipulations with these
numbers on a sort of automatic pilot. We act so as to simplify cognitive
tasks by leaning on the structures in our environment. We rely on the external
scaffolding of maps and models, of diagrams and traffic signs. Just as not
all calculations are done inside the head, so not all thinking is done
inside the head – because much of it involves an interaction with the
world outside in ways which depend on the types of sensitivity the
cognitive agent show to his surroundings of the moment, which depend
in turn on his goals, on what he is trying to achieve as an organism
active in this world.
From Fodor to Gibson
From the perspective of Fodor’s methodological solipsism the way to
understand human cognition is to study the mind/brain in abstraction
from its real-world environment (as if it were a hermetically sealed Car-
tesian ego). From the perspective of J. J. Gibson, Fodor’s nemesis (for
Gibson’s time will come), the way to understand human cognition is to
study the moving, acting human person as it exists in its real-world envi-
ronment.5 This means: taking account of how the human organism has
evolved to fit into this real-world environment in such a way as to be
sensitive to the information it contains (above all to those types of infor-
mation which are relevant to survival).
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We are, from this perspective, like highly complex tuning forks –
tuned through our batteries of sensors to the environment which sur-
rounds us in highly specific ways. Gibson himself was a psychologist of
perception. His most important work – which should be read in con-
junction with the writings of Barker and Schoggen6 – is entitled The Eco-
logical Approach to Visual Perception.7 The Fodorian holds that in order to
understand information systems we should turn aside from the hardware
and from the surrounding world in which this hardware is embedded,
and study instead manipulations of syntactic strings. The Gibsonian holds
that in order to understand information systems we should turn our at-
tentions precisely to this hardware and taking account of the environ-
ment for which it was designed and built. We then discover that infor-
mation systems, too (with their GPSs and their biological sensors), are
like highly complex tuning forks – they have evolved (or better: were de-
signed) to resonate in tune with certain highly specific surrounding en-
vironments, and their functioning is intelligible only to the degree that
we take account of the ways in which they are embedded within such en-
vironments.
Computerized Agents
The world of computerized agents – of robots, avatars, webbots – is
a world of computers situated in environments and capable of flexible,
autonomous action within such environments, including interactions –
such as communicating, negotiating, coordinating – with other agents,
both human and non-human. The orthodox methodology for dealing
with such computerized agents has been described by Rodney Brooks,8
Director of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, as the “SMPA
view” – for Sense Model Plan Act as follows:
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S: the agent first senses its environment through sensors
M: it then uses this data to build a model of the world
P: it then produces a plan to achieve goals
A: it then acts on this plan.
We are clearly once more inside a Fodorian perspective. Instead of
relying on its surrounding environment, on the SMPA conception the
agent builds an internal model of the world – an internal representation
or copy – and it is to the latter that the agent’s cognitive processes are
directed. 
In his own “Engineering Approach” to the problem of understanding
and constructing computerized agents, in contrast, Brooks (like Gibson)
lends very little weight to the role of representations or models. Rather,
he takes his inspiration from evolutionary biology. In order to produce
systems that interact directly with the world we should take as our start-
ing-point simple organisms who have solved the problems of interacting
with their surrounding physical environment in ways conducive to sur-
vival. 
The Life (and Mind) of E. Coli
Consider for example the movement of the E. coli bacterium, which
can best be described as a biased random walk.9 In the default environ-
ment, which is marked by the absence of any survival-relevant stimulus,
the cell simply wanders around, smoothly swimming by rotating its fla-
gella counterclockwise. Such runs are terminated by chaotic events,
called tumbles, when flagella rotate clockwise. Following a tumble, the
cell begins a new run, picking a direction more or less at random. Some-
times however the cell encounters sugar – more precisely it encounters
an increase in the density of a chemical attractant – to which its sensors
have been attuned by natural selection. Those runs that happen to carry
it up such a density gradient are then extended; those that happen to
carry it down the gradient are not. Over time, therefore, the cell drifts
in a favorable direction. Its life, if you like, is a life of falling down sugar
wells.
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The bacterium is a single cell. Thus it does not have a multicelled
nervous system. But it has receptor molecules acting as sensors and these
influence the behavior of its highly complex machinery of movable
flagella via a signal transduction system. Different receptors react to dif-
ferent stimuli, some to single oxygen molecules, some to much larger
carbohydrate molecules (or to molecules – perhaps produced in the la-
boratory as anti-bacterial agents – which have an external structure
which can fool the bacterium into thinking that it is dealing with carbo-
hydrate molecules). E. coli bacteria react to differences in concentrations
of sugar molecules with a behavior shift – as a dog reacts to the smelt
trace of another animal.
The attribution of intentionality, as we can see, does not depend
upon the existence of a nervous system. There is a difference between
a purely chemical system, and a system that is at once chemical and bi-
ological. We can ascribe simple biological intentionality to a single, mov-
able cell; all that is required is the existence of sensors, information me-
diation (automatic interpretation, if you like) and motor responses result-
ing in adaptable behavior.
Intelligence as Situatedness
Let us return now to Brooks’ Engineering Approach to the construc-
tion of computerized agents. Where the bacterium has one single layer
of activity, intelligent systems such as ourselves embody a number of dis-
tinct such layers, including our various batteries of sensors (perceptual
systems), as well as systems for proprioception, and so on. From Brooks’
perspective, now, we should conceive such layers (a) as operating inde-
pendently of each other, (b) as connecting directly to the environment
outside the system. 
Each layer operates as a complete system that copes in real time with
a changing environment. Each layer is a biological system that has evolved
through interaction with the world outside, and it is this world outside
which serves to unify the different layers together in such a way as to en-
sure that they become adjusted to each other mutually over time. For
Brooks therefore, an artificial system that mimics some of the features of biological
intelligence must be a situated system. 
Humans (and other organisms) fix their beliefs as they attune them-
selves differently to different parts of the world in light of their successive
experiences. As Brooks points out in his “Intelligence without Represen-
tation”, organisms sometimes mark the world by placing traces which
change what they will be confronted with in the future. Thus they do
22
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not have to carry all their memories around with them, because again:
they can lean on the structures in the external environment; they can
use the marked-up world as crutch. 
The Ecological Approach 
to External Symbolic Memory Devices
For human organisms the marked-up world includes libraries, maps,
price lists, traffic signs, science texts, border posts, restaurant menus,
fences. We can now rephrase our formulation of the views developed by
Gibson in his Ecological Approach to Visual Perception as follows. We are like
multi-layered tuning forks – tuned to the environment which surrounds
us. We have evolved in such a way as to be attuned to our environment
on multiple levels, in part because we ourselves have created this world
via what Lewontin calls “ecosystem engineering”.10 This means that we
have evolved to resonate automatically and directly, not only to those
features of our environment which are relevant for survival, but also to
new features – of language, culture, of externalized memory – which we
ourselves have put there.
In his Origins of the Modern Mind 11 Merlin Donald refers to a radical
transition in the emergence of modern human culture, which occurred
when humans began to construct elaborate symbolic systems ranging
from cuneiforms, hieroglyphics, and ideograms to alphabetic languages
and mathematics. From this point on, Donald argues, human biological
memory becomes an inadequate vehicle for storing and processing our
collective knowledge. Thus Donald sees the modern mind as being itself
a hybrid structure built from vestiges of earlier biological stages together
with new external symbolic memory devices.
Gibson’s ecological approach can now be reformulated yet again in
order to take account of Donald’s insight. To understand cognition we
should study the moving, acting organism as it exists in its real-world
environment, but now taking account of the fact that for human organ-
isms this is a social environment which includes records and traces of
prior actions in the form of communication systems (languages), storage
systems (libraries), transport systems (roads), as well as legal and financial
and political systems of a range of different sorts. The attunement of dif-
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ferent groups of specialists to these externalized symbolic memory de-
vices then allows a range of different, new sorts of activities on the part
of humankind, via a vast division of cognitive-ecological labour. Gibson
talks of the environment as an array of affordances, where: “The affor-
dances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it pro-
vides or furnishes, either for good or evil.” The environment of a com-
mercial organism includes those affordance which we call prices. The
environment of a lawyer includes those affordances which we call torts
and malfeasances. The environment of a physician includes those affor-
dances which we call symptoms and diseases on the part of his patients.
The environment of a computer-aided geologist investigating viscoelastic
flow includes those affordances which we call foreshock sequences and
processes of earthquake nucleation. The realm of affordances, and there-
by the world itself as a domain accessible to our direct cognition and ac-
tion, becomes hereby expanded – not only because of the addition of
ever new layers of external memory devices, but also because of the
addition of ever new types of prosthetic sensors, which enable us to be-
come attuned to ever new sorts of features in the environments by which
we are engaged.12
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